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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

AVOIDING STICKER SHOCK: LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO
PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS

ABSTRACT
Consumers are increasingly receiving surprise medical bills, where an
insured patient is unexpectedly billed directly for medical services received at
an in-network health care facility from an out-of-network provider. These
situations often arise in emergency rooms, operating rooms, and delivery rooms,
despite the efforts of patients to receive care only from in-network providers.
Surprise medical bills commonly leave consumers on the hook for thousands of
dollars for out-of-network services that they had no opportunity to refuse. This
article explores how the steady rise of narrow provider network health plans
and the often-corresponding lack of transparency regarding which providers
are included in the network has led to an increase in surprise medical bills. It
then examines various legislative approaches at both the federal and state level
to protect consumers from these unexpected bills. This article ultimately
proposes a statutory framework based on a modified version of New York’s law
that would effectively remove consumers from surprise medical bill disputes,
leaving reimbursement arguments to health plans and providers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Peter Drier was prepared. 1 He had been anticipating this surgery for
months. After presenting with excruciating pain in his upper back and numbness
in his hand, a scan revealed that Mr. Drier had herniated disks in his back. He
needed spinal fusion surgery. Mr. Drier did his homework, diligently
researching his insurance plan to ensure the implants and surgical screws were
covered and that his surgeon, anesthesiologist, orthopedist, and the hospital
where the surgical procedure was scheduled were all either inside his provider
network or willing to settle on a reimbursement rate with his health plan. Mr.
Drier knew the procedure would be expensive, and he was prepared for the bills
as they began to arrive. Despite his meticulous preparation, he was astounded
when he received the $117,000 bill from an “assistant surgeon” whom he had
never met. This surgeon, who happened to be the chief of neurosurgery at
another hospital, had unexpectedly participated in Mr. Drier’s care without his
knowledge, and Mr. Drier was sent the bill. A second pair of hands was
apparently needed during Mr. Drier’s spinal fusion, which is usually provided
by a hospital employee such as a resident, nurse, or physician assistant for no
additional charge. When no such provider was available, the neurosurgeon came
to help unexpectedly. Mr. Drier thought he had done everything he possibly
could have to be informed and prepared. He expressed his feeling of
helplessness, saying, “[T]his was just so wrong—I had no choice and no
negotiating power.” 2
Mr. Drier is not alone. Consumers are increasingly receiving these
“surprise” medical bills, where an insured patient is unexpectedly billed for care
received at an in-network health care facility from an out-of-network provider. 3
According to a national survey, thirty percent of privately insured Americans
received a surprise medical bill from 2013 to 2015. 4 Many consumers receive
surprise medical bills despite their due diligence in attempting to receive care
only from in-network providers; one in seven insured Americans has been
surprised to discover that a provider they thought was in-network was actually
considered out-of-network. 5 Consumer Reports, an independent, nonprofit

1. Elisabeth Rosenthal, After Surgery, Surprise $117,000 Medical Bill from Doctor He
Didn’t Know, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/us/drive-by-doc
toring-surprise-medical-bills.html (last visited July 24, 2017).
2. Id.
3. Elisabeth Ponsot & Daniel Moritz-Rabson, Americans Who Confronted ‘Surprise’
Medical Bills Share Their Stories, PBS NEWSHOUR (June 26, 2016, 2:53 PM), www.pbs.org/news
hour/updates/americans-who-confronted-surprise-medical-bills-share-their-stories/ (last visited
July 24, 2017).
4. CONSUMER REPORTS NAT’L RESEARCH CTR., SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS SURVEY 8
(2015), consumersunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/CY-2015-SURPRISE-MEDICALBILLS-SURVEY-REPORT-PUBLIC.pdf.
5. Id.
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organization that promotes the interests of consumers, 6 has collected over 4000
stories from consumers who have struggled to pay surprise medical bills. 7
The surprise bill itself usually involves two components. The first
component “reflects the difference in patient cost-sharing between in-network
and out-of-network providers.” 8 The second component reflects balance billing,
where the beneficiary is charged the difference between the plan’s negotiated,
discounted fee it has agreed to pay for a given service with its in-network
providers and the full fee the out-of-network provider charges for the service. 9
Surprise medical bills usually occur: (1) in an emergency situation when a
patient has no control over the emergency room, treating physicians, or
ambulance selected 10 or (2) in a non-emergency situation when a patient plans
to receive care from an in-network facility, but out-of-network providers
unexpectedly participate in the patient’s care in either the inpatient context 11 or
the outpatient context. 12 The first scenario occurs because, as the American
6. CONSUMER REPORTS, https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/about-us/index.htm (last
visited July 23, 2017).
7. Donna Rosato, 5 Doctors Most Likely to Stick You with Surprise Medical Bills, CONSUMER
REPORTS (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/medical-billing/5-doctors-likely-tostick-you-with-surprise-medical-bills/ (last visited July 23, 2017).
8. Karen Pollitz, Surprise Medical Bills, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 17, 2016), www.kff.org
/private-insurance/issue-brief/surprise-medical-bills/ (last visited July 23, 2016).
9. Id.; see also U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Balance Billing,
HEALTHCARE.GOV: GLOSSARY, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/balance-billing/ (last visited
July 23, 2017).
10. Zack Cooper & Fiona Scott Morton, Out-of-Network Emergency-Physician Bills — An
Unwelcome Surprise, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1915, 1916 (2016) (finding from a national data
sample of 2.2 million emergency room visits, twenty-two percent of patients who went to innetwork emergency rooms were balance billed for care received from an out-of-network physician);
see also, e.g., BENJAMIN LAWSKY, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., AN UNWELCOME SURPRISE:
HOW NEW YORKERS ARE GETTING STUCK WITH UNEXPECTED MEDICAL BILLS FROM OUT-OFNETWORK PROVIDERS 19 (2012) (reporting that the average out-of-network emergency bill was
$7,006, and while insurers paid an average of $3,228, consumers were left with a bill of “$3,778
for an emergency in which they had no choice”). Consumers living in rural areas who require lifesaving air ambulance flights are increasingly facing extraordinary balance billing when their
insurance companies do not have an in-network air ambulance company, leading to formal
complaints to state auditors. Corin Cates-Carney, Insurers, Air Ambulance Companies Spar over
Costs at Legislative Hearing, MONT. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 4, 2016), mtpr.org/post/insurers-airambulance-companies-spar-over-costs-legislative-hearing (last visited July 23, 2017).
11. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 1; see also Erin Taylor & Layla Parast, A Tale of Two
Deliveries, or an Out-of-Network Problem, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 3, 2015), healthaffairs.org/
blog/2015/11/03/a-tale-of-two-deliveries-or-an-out-of-network-problem/ (last visited July 23,
2017) (telling the story of two women with the same health insurance plan who gave birth on
different days at the same in-network hospital, but only one was billed $1600 from an out-ofnetwork anesthesiologist who happened to be working that day).
12. See, e.g., Stephanie O’Neill, California Aims to Limit Surprise Medical Bills, NPR (Sept.
11, 2016, 5:11 AM), www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/09/11/493233748/california-aims-to
-limit-surprise-medical-bills (last visited July 23, 2017) (telling the story of a woman who received
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Medical Association (AMA) reports, out of all major specialties, emergency
medicine physicians are most likely to be independent contractors, 13 meaning
they are more likely to have out-of-network status even when working at an innetwork facility, and patients do not have the ability to refuse care or worry
about the network status of their providers when in an emergency situation. One
study reports that one in five hospitals that are in-network for the three largest
health insurers by market share in Texas have zero in-network emergency room
physicians, 14 meaning all emergency services billed by these providers will be
at the out-of-network rate. Although the Public Health Service Act requires that
all non-grandfathered health plans only charge in-network cost sharing for
emergency services provided by an out-of-network hospital, 15 no federal
legislation prohibits an out-of-network emergency room physician from balance
billing the patient. 16 The second scenario occurs because: (1) assistant
physicians are pulled in unexpectedly to help the attending physician with a
surgical procedure or for a consult, and (2) hospitals tend to “use physician
outsourcing firms for anesthesiologists, emergency room physicians,
hospitalists, pathologists and radiologists.” 17 These physician specialties
frequently do not participate in the same health plans as the hospital, meaning
patients may strategically schedule procedures at an in-network hospital with an
in-network attending physician but may still receive unexpected bills from outof-network providers that participated in their care. 18 Patients are often in
scenarios where verifying the network status of every assisting provider that
walks in the room would be either unreasonable (such as a patient in the middle

a mastectomy follow-up surgery from an in-network outpatient facility but unexpectedly received
a $580 bill for an out-of-network anesthesiologist).
13. See CAROL K. KANE & DAVID W. EMMONS, AM. MED. ASS’N, POLICY RESEARCH
PERSPECTIVES: NEW DATA ON PHYSICIAN PRACTICE ARRANGEMENTS: PRIVATE PRACTICE
REMAINS STRONG DESPITE SHIFTS TOWARD HOSPITAL EMPLOYMENT 10 ex. 2 (2013),
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/premium/health-policy/prp-physician
-practice-arrangements_0.pdf (American Medical Association 2012 Physician Practice Benchmark
Survey).
14. STACEY POGUE & MEGAN RANDALL, CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY PRIORITIES, SURPRISE
MEDICAL BILLS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF TEXANS: LITTLE-KNOWN PRACTICE CREATES A “SECOND
EMERGENCY” FOR ER PATIENTS 4 (2014), forabettertexas.org/images/HC_2014_09_PP_Balance
Billing.pdf.
15. Public Health Service Act § 2719A(b)(l)(C)(ii)(II), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19a (2012) (“[I]f
[emergency] services are provided [to a participant, beneficiary, or enrollee] out-of-network, the
cost-sharing requirement (expressed as a copayment amount or coinsurance rate) is the same
requirement that would apply if such services were provided in-network . . . .”).
16. Pollitz, supra note 8.
17. Bob Herman, Billing Squeeze: Hospitals in Middle as Insurers and Doctors Battle over
Out-of-Network Charges, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 29, 2015), www.modernhealthcare.com/arti
cle/20150829/MAGAZINE/308299987 (last visited July 23, 2017).
18. Id.
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of childbirth) or impossible (such as an anesthetized patient in the middle of a
surgical procedure).
In both scenarios, the health plan and out-of-network provider often enter a
battle over the proper rate for services rendered, with the consumer usually on
the losing end. At the heart of the dispute is who is financially responsible for
costs associated with out-of-network care—the health plan could cover the entire
out-of-network rate billed, the out-of-network provider could accept the health
plan’s rate, or the consumer could pay the balance of the bill. Health plans and
out-of-network providers are obstinately unwilling to negotiate with each other.
UnitedHealthcare recently stated that it is “deeply concerned that some hospitalbased physicians are establishing out-of-network strategies to seek excessively
high reimbursement levels, sometimes more than 10 times what an in-network
physician would charge for the same service,” and accordingly announced that
it was lowering how much it would reimburse out-of-network providers,
exposing consumers to potentially larger balance bills. 19 Insurance companies
are concerned that physicians may strategically refuse to join a health plan
network in order to later bill that health plan, as an out-of-network provider, at
a rate higher than the contracted reimbursement rate. 20 This strategy allows
physicians to circumvent price competition and undermines a health plan’s
ability to control costs and quality, which is the very basis of a network health
plan as previously discussed. On the other side, out-of-network providers
maintain that “the real crux of the problem is health insurers are refusing to pay
fair market rates for the care and services provided . . . . It’s the insurer who
refuses to negotiate in good faith and pay a fair rate.” 21 With such polarized, but
equally-stubborn, stances on medical billing rates, the consumer is left paying
for the large difference in rates. Although the Department of Health and Human
Services regulates the rate that insurers must pay out-of-network providers, 22

19. Jordan Shapiro, Insurer’s Policy Change Could Leave Patients on the Hook for Bills, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 29, 2015), www.stltoday.com/business/local/insurer-s-policychange-could-leave-patients-on-the-hook/article_2573dc50-33e6-5840-ac8f-3abcef0b12cb.html
(last visited July 23, 2017).
20. See id.
21. Harris Meyer, Vital Signs Blog: New AMA Leader Rejects Growing Movement to Regulate
Out-of-Network Doc Bills, MOD. HEALTHCARE (June 14, 2015), www.modernhealthcare.com/arti
cle/20150614/blog/150619956 (last visited July 23, 2017).
22. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,188, 37,194 (June 28, 2010)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 146, 147) (requiring that insurers pay out-of-network providers
the greatest of (i) the in-network rate for emergency services, (ii) a payment based on the methods
the plan generally uses to determine payments for out-of-network services (such as the usual,
customary, and reasonable amount), or (iii) the amount that Medicare would pay for the emergency
services).
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this does not prevent the provider from billing the patient the balance of the
reimbursement requested and the reimbursement received from the insurer. 23
Section II explores why surprise medical billing has become more
common—due to the increasing popularity and prevalence of narrow network
health plans. As will be discussed, narrow networks are used by insurance
companies as a strategy to lower premiums and exercise greater control over
quality of care. However, as networks narrow, more providers are excluded from
the network, which leads to surprise medical billing situations, as examined
further. Section III describes federal law approaches to protecting consumers
from surprise medical billing that ultimately fall short, including (1) the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS’) network adequacy standard for
Marketplace Qualified Health Plans (QHPs) and (2) the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners’ (NAIC’s) updated Health Benefit Plan Network
Access and Adequacy Model Act (Model Act), which is meant to serve as model
legislation for states to consider adopting. As this comment illustrates, states that
have yet to adopt legislation addressing surprise balance billing ought to
understand the shortcomings of these federal approaches and look to legislation
that other states have implemented in order to determine which statutory
framework best protects consumers. Section IV evaluates a spectrum of state
laws aimed at protecting consumers from surprise medical bills. Statutes in
Massachusetts, Texas, and New York are critically examined as examples of
potential legislative approaches. Section V recommends and justifies a
comprehensive legislative approach to protect consumers from surprise medical
bills based on a modified version of New York’s law.
Ultimately, this comment recommends the adoption of a statutory
framework that includes the following provisions: (1) for emergency services,
ban out-of-network providers from balance billing patients for costs beyond innetwork cost sharing if services are rendered at an in-network facility; (2) for
non-emergency services, hold patients harmless for out-of-pocket costs beyond
in-network cost sharing if services are rendered at an in-network facility and
patients submit an assignment of benefits form; (3) ban anti-assignment clauses
from health plans in surprise medical billing contexts to ensure that patients can
assign benefits to providers; (4) count cost sharing for services provided by an
out-of-network provider towards annual out-of-pocket limits; and (5) establish
an independent, state-run arbitration process that uses an external standard for
dispute resolution. This statutory framework is aimed at insulating consumers
from unfair financial responsibility arising from surprise medical bill situations,
but should also work in conjunction with recommended disclosure and
transparency requirements so as to prevent surprise billing situations from
23. Id. (“Out-of-network providers may, however, also balance bill patients for the difference
between the providers’ charges and the amount collected from the plan or issuer and from the
patient in the form of a copayment or coinsurance amount.”).
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developing as often as possible and to protect informed consumer choice. The
justification, implementation, and enforcement of the recommended legislation
is explored.
Section VI briefly concludes that as narrow network plans proliferate, it is
more important than ever before for states to enact legislation that protects
vulnerable consumers from surprise medical bills they could not have avoided.
Consumers should be removed from the equation in these situations so that the
balance bill dispute can be left to those who are best equipped to fight it: health
plans and providers.
II. THE PROLIFERATION OF NARROW NETWORK HEALTH PLANS AND THE
CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS
Before discussing how to address the issue of surprise medical bills, it is
useful to understand why they are becoming so common in the first place.
Surprise medical bills are increasingly relevant because of the steady rise of
narrow network insurance plans and the often-corresponding lack of
transparency regarding which providers are included in the network. Due to the
unique role that narrow networks play in the insurance market as a means to
lower premiums and raise quality standards, narrow networks are likely here to
stay, meaning that the issue of surprise medical bills will remain a concern for
many individuals.
A.

The Rise of Narrow Networks

A surprise medical bill fundamentally arises when an out-of-network
provider provides care to a patient at an in-network facility. This scenario is
becoming increasingly common as more and more providers are being excluded
from provider networks due to a rise in narrow network plans. In 2017, nearly
seventy-five percent of health insurance plans offered through the health
insurance marketplace in eighteen states will have narrow networks,
demonstrating an increase from sixty-four percent of plans in 2016 and fifty-one
percent of plans in 2015. 24 Forty-nine percent of Marketplace plans are
categorized as either narrow or ultra-narrow; specifically, twenty-two percent of
plans are narrow, meaning that the plans limit their contracting to thirty-one to
seventy percent of local hospitals, while seventeen percent of plans are ultra24. MCKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM, 2017 EXCHANGE MARKET: PLAN TYPE
TRENDS 1 (2016), healthcare.mckinsey.com/sites/default/files/2017-OEP-Plan-Type-Trends-Info
graphic_VF.pdf.
For an example of how the public media is portraying this data, see Anna Wilde Mathews, Insurers
Move to Limit Options in Health-Care Exchange Plans: Losses on Affordable Care Act Exchanges
Spur Narrower Choice of Doctors, Hospitals, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/insurers-move-to-limit-options-in-health-care-exchange-plans-1472664663 (last visited
July 23, 2017) (describing narrow network plans as the direct response to “intense pressure to curb
costs that have led to losses on the Affordable Care Act exchanges”).
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narrow, meaning that the plans limit their contracting to zero to thirty percent of
local hospitals. 25 Narrow network plans restrict consumer choice of health care
providers (e.g., physicians, hospitals, out-patient clinics, pharmacies, labs, etc.)
in exchange for lower monthly premiums. 26 The general purpose behind narrow
network plans is to steer beneficiaries towards lower-cost, higher-quality
providers. 27
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) revitalized the attention on narrow
networks, but the concept of a limited provider network is far from new. Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), one type of narrow network plan, first
appeared on the health insurance scene in the 1920s and gained popularity in the
1970s and 1980s. 28 At times, HMOs were criticized by consumers and providers
who were frustrated with either the lack of choices of health care providers or
the prospect of lower reimbursement rates. 29 However, modern narrow network
plans are more likely to thrive in terms of longevity and success because they
are uniquely driven by the demands of individual consumers for lower-cost
health insurance, as opposed to being purchased nearly exclusively by large or
governmental employers. 30
Narrow network plans are growing in popularity for two main reasons: (1)
they lower overall premiums because providers with high reimbursement rates
are excluded from the network, meaning beneficiaries only receive health care
services, with the exception of emergency care, from providers that have
contractually agreed to lower reimbursement rates, and (2) they keep referrals to
in-network providers who have contractually agreed to certain quality measures
that contribute to coordinated care for beneficiaries. 31 First, the ability to offer
lower premiums is a valuable tool for attracting potential beneficiaries that are
shopping for health insurance because price is cited as the most important factor
in choosing a health plan, even more important than breadth of provider choice

25. NOAM BAUMAN ET AL., MCKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM, HOSPITAL
NETWORKS: EVOLUTION OF THE CONFIGURATIONS ON THE 2015 EXCHANGES 1–2 (2015), health
care.mckinsey.com/sites/default/files/2015HospitalNetworks.pdf.
26. Thomas H. Lee & Katherine Baicker, Interview: Are High-Deductible Plans vs. Narrow
Networks Really Our Two Options?, NEW ENG. J. MED. CATALYST (Mar. 17, 2016), catalyst.nejm.
org/high-deductible-plans-vs-narrow-networks-really-two-options/ (last visited July 25, 2017).
27. Id.
28. Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care Utilization Review, and Financial Risk Shifting:
Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
1, 20–21 (1993).
29. William Sherman, A News Reporter Explains His “HMO Horror Stories”, MANAGED
CARE (Sept. 1997), https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9709/9709.reporterview.html
(last visited July 25, 2017).
30. Deborah Farringer, Everything Old is New Again: Will Narrow Networks Succeed Where
HMOs Failed? 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 299, 304–05 (2016).
31. JIM WATSON, PBC ADVISORS, BIG CHANGES IN 2016 TO MARKETPLACE PLANS 1 (2016),
www.pbcgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Big-Changes-in-2016-Marketplace-Plans.pdf.
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or range of covered services. 32 This is significant in projecting the future success
of narrow network plans considering the competitiveness of narrow network
prices is increasing while the competitiveness of broad network prices is
decreasing. 33 Narrow network plans are most likely “here to stay.” 34
Narrow provider networks are central to various insurance products. HMOs
require beneficiaries to select an in-network primary care physician (PCP) who
serves as a gatekeeper, providing referrals to in-network specialists as needed. 35
HMOs tend to not cover any health care services provided by out-of-network
providers, with the exception of emergency care, meaning the beneficiary is
generally responsible for the entire cost unless otherwise specified in the plan. 36
Point of Service (POS) plans also require beneficiaries to select an in-network
PCP gatekeeper, and beneficiaries pay lower cost sharing for obtaining services
from in-network providers and pay higher cost sharing for services received
from out-of-network providers. 37 Exclusive Provider Organizations (EPOs) do
not require specialist referrals from a PCP, but exclusively offer coverage of
health care services received from an in-network provider like an HMO. 38
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) also do not require specialist referrals
from a PCP, but they offer lower cost sharing when services are obtained from
an in-network provider and higher cost sharing when services are obtained from
an out-of-network provider, similar to a POS plan. 39 Tiered network plans divide

32. LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET AL., URBAN INST. HEALTH POLICY CTR., HEALTH REFORM
MONITORING SURVEY: FACTORS INFLUENCING HEALTH PLAN CHOICE AMONG THE
MARKETPLACE TARGET POPULATION ON THE EVE OF HEALTH REFORM 2 (2013), hrms.urban.org
/briefs/hrms_decision_factors.html (last visited July 25, 2017). Price has been shown to be the
dominating decision factor on health plan choice at the state level as well. MARY L. SMILEY, CTR.
FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & TRANSFORMATION, HEALTH PLAN SELECTION: FACTORS
INFLUENCING MICHIGANDERS’ CHOICE OF HEALTH INSURANCE 4 (2015), www.chrt.org/docu
ment/health-plan-selection-factors-influencing-michiganders-choice-of-health-insurance/ (last
visited August 22, 2017).
33. MCKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM, supra note 24, at 1.
34. Sara Hansard, Higher Cost-Sharing, Narrow Networks, Here to Stay in ACA Health Plans,
BLOOMBERG BNA HEALTH CARE BLOG (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.bna.com/higher-costsharingnarrow-b57982059160/ (last visited July 25, 2017); Merrill Goozner, Building Narrow Networks
that Work, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Dec. 21, 2013), www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20131221/
MAGAZINE/312219986 (last visited July 25, 2017).
35. U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Health Insurance Plan & Network
Types: HMOs, PPOs, and More, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.Gov/choose-a-plan/
plan-types/ (last visited July 25, 2017).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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in-network providers into various tiers, usually determined by cost or quality. 40
Beneficiaries pay lower cost sharing if they obtain health care services from
providers in the preferred tier and pay higher cost sharing if they obtain services
from providers in less-preferred tiers. 41 Other plans use a reference pricing
scheme, where the plan agrees to pay a fixed amount, or “reference price,” for a
given health care service, and charge the excess bill (if there is any) to the
beneficiary. 42 Therefore, if a beneficiary selects a service or provider whose rate
exceeds the reference price, the beneficiary is responsible for the whole
difference between the reference price and that provider’s contracted rate. 43 The
above plans financially incentivize beneficiaries to receive health care services
from a limited network of providers that are either employed by or contracted
with the insurer. The narrower a network becomes, the more likely a provider
who is (even remotely) involved in the medical care of a patient may have an
out-of-network status.
B.

The Lack of Transparency About Provider Networks

Plans with narrow networks may lack transparency regarding which
providers are included in the network, both when purchasing a plan and
afterwards. There is often a persisting lack of clarity surrounding which
providers are in the beneficiary’s network and which are not. 44 When consumers
are not adequately informed about which providers are participating in a plan’s
network, they cannot make informed decisions about their care, such as when
attempting to schedule a surgical procedure with only in-network providers.
Nearly seven in ten insured Americans who have unaffordable out-of-network
medical bills did not know that the health care provider was considered out-ofnetwork at the time of treatment. 45 Especially in narrow or tiered networks, clear
communication regarding which providers are included in the plan’s network
40. PAUL FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., TIERED NETWORKS FOR HOSPITAL
PHYSICIAN HEALTH CARE SERVICES 5 (2003), https://www.ebri.org/publications/ib/index.
cfm?fa=ibDisp&content_id=179 (last visited July 26, 2017).
41. Id.
42. PAUL FRONSTIN & M. CHRISTOPHER ROEBUCK, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST.,
REFERENCE PRICING FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES: A NEW TWIST ON THE DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION CONCEPT IN EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS 5 (2014), https://www.ebri.
org/pdf/briefspdf/ebri_ib_398_apr14.refprcng.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Kelly A. Kyanko et al., Out-of-Network Physicians: How Prevalent Are Involuntary Use
and Cost Transparency?, 48 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1154, 1154 (2013) (reporting that “52 percent[]
of individuals using out-of-network services experienced at least one contact with an out-ofnetwork physician where cost was not transparent at the time of care”).
45. LIZ HAMEL ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND., THE BURDEN OF MEDICAL DEBT: RESULTS
FROM THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION/NEW YORK TIMES MEDICAL BILLS SURVEY 12 (2016),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/8806-the-burden-of-medical-debt-re
sults-from-the-kaiser-family-foundation-new-york-times-medical-bills-survey.pdf.
AND

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

AVOIDING STICKER SHOCK

189

may not only be lacking between the insurer and beneficiary but also between
the insurer and contracted physicians. Often, physicians may participate in an
insurer’s broader network but are unaware that they are categorized as out-ofnetwork for patients in specific plans with narrow or tiered networks. 46 While
most plans provide health provider directories, they often contain outdated or
inaccurate information. 47
This lack of transparency regarding provider network status fundamentally
undermines the very concept underlying narrow network plans—that consumers
can benefit from lower cost sharing if they choose providers within the plan’s
network. For this structure to work, consumers need access to adequate
information to have an opportunity to make informed choices about providers.
The lack of transparency surrounding provider network status can lead to
surprise medical billing situations, where consumers are uninformed about the
out-of-network status of providers who render health care services. Narrow
networks are not going anywhere, and it is essential to protect consumers from
being caught in the middle of billing disputes that lie outside of their control.
III. FEDERAL LAW APPROACHES TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM SURPRISE
MEDICAL BILLS THAT ARE ULTIMATELY INADEQUATE
In an effort to protect consumers from surprise medical billing, CMS and
NAIC have developed their own approaches to address such scenarios in
commercial health plans. While well-intended, both of these federal approaches
ultimately fall short in offering consumer protections from surprise medical
billing.
A.

CMS’ Final 2017 Benefit and Payment Parameters Rule

CMS issued the final 2017 Benefit and Payment Parameters Rule (Final
Rule) for QHPs offered on the ACA Marketplaces, which specifically addresses
surprise balance billing. For 2018 and later benefit years, “for a network to be
deemed adequate, each QHP that uses a provider network must . . . count the
cost sharing paid by an enrollee for an essential health benefit provided by an
out-of-network ancillary provider in an in-network setting towards the enrollee’s
annual limitation on cost sharing or provide a written notice” that such charges,
including balance billing charges, “may not count toward the in-network annual

46. Jon H. Sutton, Health Care Networks: Surprise Billings for Surgical Patients, BULL. AM.
C. SURGEONS (July 1, 2016), bulletin.facs.org/2016/07/health-care-networks/ (last visited July 26,
2017).
47. TEX. MED. ASS’N, PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: NETWORK INADEQUACY AND
UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE 17 (2014) (reporting that “62 percent of physicians had
detected cases in which they were listed as participating when they were not, and 58 percent of
physicians had detected cases where they were not listed when they were participating in a plan”).
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limitation on cost sharing.” 48 Alternatively, each QHP with a provider network
must provide written notice to enrollees at least forty-eight hours before
rendering a service scheduled at an in-network facility that the enrollee might
receive a service from an out-of-network ancillary provider and that any
additional charges may not count toward the in-network cost-sharing limit. 49
Regardless, the statutory definition of cost sharing “does not include . . . balance
billing amounts for non-network providers.” 50
While it is promising that CMS at least addresses surprise balance billing as
a matter of network adequacy, the American Hospital Association (AHA) aptly
points out that because the “regulatory definition of cost sharing excludes
balance billing, [this provision provides] little financial protection for consumers
facing unexpected medical bills resulting from out-of-network providers at innetwork facilities.” 51 Although some have interpreted this to mean that CMS is
attempting to include balancing billing in the definition of cost sharing, 52 most
perceive that the referenced cost sharing still does not include balance billing, as
the statutory definition establishes. 53 Thus, CMS’ approach to surprise medical
bills places the burden entirely on the consumer to simply pay the balance bill,
and this bill amount does not even go towards the annual limitation on cost
sharing. This regulation potentially discourages providers from joining health
plan networks by incentivizing them to perform services at in-network facilities
and then balance billing patients in order to make more money than the lower
contract rate earned by in-network providers. 54 This is especially tempting
considering the amount billed for out-of-network care in the emergency room,
for example, was 798% of Medicare rates, compared to the average in-network
48. Qualified Health Plan Minimum Certification Standards, 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(e) (2016).
49. Id.
50. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(3)(B) (2010).
51. American Hospital Association, Comment to the Proposed Rule Regarding HHS Notice
of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2017 Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(Dec. 18, 2015), www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2015/151218-cl-cms-9937-p-rin0938-aS
57.pdf.
52. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Comment to the Proposed Rule
Regarding HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2018 Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.uschamber.com/comment/comment-letterhhs-benefit-and-payment-parameters-2018-proposed-rule (last visited July 26, 2017).
53. See, e.g., Timothy Jost, The Final 2018 Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters (Part
2), HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Dec. 18, 2016), healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/12/18/the-final-2018-noticeof-benefit-and-payment-parameters-part-2/ (last visited July 26, 2017).
54. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment
Parameters for 2017, 81 Fed. Reg. 12,204, 12,305 (Mar. 8, 2016) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 144,
147, 153, 154 155, 156, & 158) (Several commenters “requested that HHS adopt NAIC Network
Adequacy Model Act provisions instead. Other commenters were concerned that the proposal may
have unintended consequences, such as disincentivizing providers from contracting with issuers in
order to be able to balance bill consumers, or incentivizing consumers and out-of-network providers
to elect to perform procedures at an in-network facility.”).
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amount of 297% of Medicare rates for the same service. 55 The AHA rightly
recognizes this unfair burden on consumers who have no control over the outof-network care they receive and thus recommends that CMS adopts the NAIC
Network Adequacy Model Act, 56 which offers consumers more financial
protection from surprise medical bills. While concerns voiced during the noticeand-comment phase about CMS’ approach did not persuade the agency to
change its rule, CMS did express its willingness to amend the policy in the future
to address the surprise medical bill issue after first giving health plans and
providers an opportunity to work through the issue by themselves. 57
The Final Rule was selected for review because it regulates a significant
number of commercial health plans available in the private market. CMS has
taken a more aggressive approach towards limiting surprise medical bills in
other narrow contexts involving Medicare and Medicaid. 58 However, this
writing is focused on how to best regulate the broad array of commercial
insurance products, so those CMS regulations are outside the scope of this
comment.
B.

The NAIC Network Adequacy Model Act

The NAIC is a regulatory support organization, comprised of and
administered by chief insurance regulators from all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and five U.S. territories, which recommends industry standards based
on the collective views of domestic and international state insurance
regulators. 59 In November 2015, the NAIC released its Health Benefit Plan
Network Access and Adequacy Model Act (Model Act), a revised version of its
1996 Managed Care Plan Network Adequacy Model, in response to the trend
toward narrow network plans. 60 As its name suggests, the Model Act is intended
to provide states with model legislation to regulate insurance reasonably and to
55. Cooper & Morton, supra note 10, at 1917.
56. American Hospital Association, supra note 51, at 4.
57. Bob Herman, Obama Administration Backs Off on ACA Rules for 2017 Health Plans,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 29, 2016), www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160229/NEWS/1602
29878 (last visited July 27, 2017) (“Our intent in establishing this policy beginning for the 2018
benefit year is to permit us to monitor ongoing efforts by issuers and providers to address the
complex issue of surprise out-of-network cost sharing at in-network facilities across all CMS
programs in a holistic manner, and amend our policy in the future to accommodate progress on this
issue, if warranted.”).
58. Social Security Act § 1902(n)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(n)(3)(B) (2012) (banning
Medicare providers from balance billing dually eligible individuals enrolled in the Qualified
Medicare Beneficiary Program).
59. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, CTR. FOR INS. POLICY AND RESEARCH, STATE
INSURANCE REGULATION 2 (2011), www.naic.org/documents/topics_white_paper_hist_ins_
reg.pdf.
60. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, Network Adequacy, NAIC.ORG (July 14, 2015),
www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_network_adequacy.htm (last visited July 26, 2017).
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protect consumers. 61 Accordingly, certain provisions of the Model Act provide
protections against surprise medical bills. 62
In emergency situations, medical bills must include notice that enrollees are
only responsible for paying “their applicable in-network cost-sharing amount,
but ha[ve] no legal obligation to pay the remaining balance.” 63 However,
enrollees are required to forward the bill to their health plan “if the difference in
the billed charge and the plan’s allowable amount is more than [$500.00]” for
consideration under a mandated “Provider Mediation Process” orchestrated by
the health plan. 64 This provision effectively removes consumers from the
medical bill dispute, leaving the health plan and out-of-network provider to
negotiate and agree upon a reasonable rate through the mediation process,
effectively protecting consumers.
In non-emergency situations, providers are required to provide enrollees a
written disclosure stating that services may be rendered by out-of-network
providers, a range of charges for out-of-network care that enrollees may be
responsible for covering, and that enrollees can obtain a list of in-network
providers from their health plans that enrollees may request to participate in their
care. 65 This notice is to be provided both at the time of scheduling or precertification and at the time of admission. 66 This approach is focused on
transparency—making consumers aware that there may be out-of-network costs
associated with care rendered at an in-network facility. The Model Act
theoretically affords more control to consumers by providing an opportunity to
obtain a list of in-network providers from their health plan and to request that
only those listed providers render care.
However, this approach works better in theory than in practice, particularly
with regard to requesting ancillary providers like anesthesiologists, radiologists,
and pathologists. Such providers are usually assigned to the patient by the health
care facility or physician group, and while there may be attempts to honor
requests for a specific anesthesiologist, for example, health care facilities and
physician groups often disclaim that fulfilling such requests may not be
possible. 67 This places consumers in a difficult situation, forcing them to decide
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN NETWORK ACCESS AND ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 7(C)(1)
(NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2015), www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-74.pdf [hereinafter MODEL
ACT].
64. Id.
65. Id. § 7(B).
66. Id. § 7(B)(1)–(2).
67. See, e.g., HOSP. FOR SPECIAL SURGERY, Anesthesia Frequently Asked Questions,
https://www.hss.edu/anesthesiology-frequently-asked-questions.asp (last visited July 28, 2017)
(stating that a patient’s anesthesiologist will be assigned by the hospital on the day before the
scheduled surgery and that the hospital “cannot promise a specific anesthesiologist . . . prior to
surgery, [but] do[es] consider patients’ preferences”); SUTTER HEALTH, Hospital Anesthesia
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whether to reschedule a procedure that they may have had scheduled for months
or to proceed with the procedure and deal with the out-of-network bill later.
Consumers may also not know how to navigate the search for a specialist or may
understandably be more concerned with other aspects of an invasive procedure
(surgical risks, post-operative rehabilitation, etc.) that do not involve provider
network status. Additionally, consumers may not know all the types or number
of providers that might participate in their scheduled procedure. Recall the story
of Mr. Drier, who was blindsided by a bill from an assistant surgeon who
unexpectedly participated in his neck surgery. 68 Providers may be pulled into
the operating room at the last minute for a consult or to assist with the procedure
upon request of the attending physician, without the anesthetized patient
knowing until a bill arrives weeks later. Therefore, while this provision of the
Model Act is well intended, it does little to protect consumers who have minimal
bargaining power in scheduling ancillary providers like anesthesiologists or in
controlling assistant providers who unexpectedly participate in their care.
Whenever a balance bill is received, the Model Act gives enrollees the
option to pay the balance of the bill or “if the difference in the billed charge and
the plan’s allowable amount is more than [$500.00],” enrollees may send the bill
to their health plans for processing under a mandated provider mediation
process. 69 The Model Act requires that all health plans establish a provider
mediation process for cases where out-of-network providers wish to protest the
benchmark payment rate of the higher of the health plan’s in-network rate or a
state-determined percentage of the Medicare payment rate in the geographic area
for the same or similar services. 70 Unlike an arbitration process that concludes
with a binding decision, in a mediation process, the health plan and out-ofnetwork provider negotiate with the assistance of a neutral third party until both
sides agree on a reimbursement price. 71 While this mediation process, a unique
proposal compared to CMS’ Final Rule, provides a mechanism to negotiate, outof-network providers and health plans are not required to arrive at a mutually
agreeable reimbursement rate at the end of the process. Furthermore, mediation
Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.sutterhealth.org/hospital-anthesthesia/index.html (last
visited July 28, 2017) (stating that “while [the hospital] will do [their] best to honor requests [for a
specific anesthesiologist], this may not be possible”); CORE PHYSICIANS, Anesthesia – Frequently
Asked Questions, https://www.corephysicians.org/Services/Specialty-Care/Anesthesia/AnesthesiaFrequently-Asked-Questions (last visited July 28, 2017) (stating that while the physician group
“do[es their] best to honor these requests [for a specific anesthesiologist] . . . it may not be possible
due to emergencies or scheduling issues”).
68. Rosenthal, supra note 1.
69. MODEL ACT § 7(D) (“Limitation on Balance Billing Covered Persons”).
70. Id. § 7F–7G(1) (“Provider Mediation Process” and “Benchmark for non-participating
facility-based provider payments”).
71. Id. § 7G(1); JACK HOADLEY ET AL., THE CTR. ON HEALTH INS. REFORMS, GEO. UNIV.
HEALTH POLICY INST., BALANCE BILLING: HOW ARE STATES PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM
UNEXPECTED CHARGES? 7 (2015).
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does not necessarily result in a fair negotiated rate as one party may have greater
bargaining power.
The Model Act has the potential to be very influential in the regulation of
health insurance because CMS and most states tend to at least consider the
provisions submitted by the NAIC, and the primary role of insurance regulation
historically falls to the states, as reaffirmed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of
1945. 72 States that have yet to adopt legislation addressing surprise balance
billing ought to understand the shortcomings of the Model Act and look to
approaches other states have implemented, as explored in Section IV, in order
to determine which statutory framework best protects consumers.
IV. A SPECTRUM OF STATE LAW APPROACHES THAT PROTECT CONSUMERS
FROM SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS
Aside from the federal approaches, there are various state approaches to
limit the surprise medical billing of consumers. State legislation that addresses
surprise medical billing tends to contain varying combinations of four key
elements: (1) disclosure and transparency requirements, (2) balance billing
prohibitions, (3) hold harmless provisions, and (4) creation of adequate provider
payment schemes. 73 This comment focuses on three representative statutes
selected as examples to demonstrate the general spectrum of state legislative
frameworks that protect consumers from surprise medical billing, from least
protective to most protective.
A.

Massachusetts: Hold Harmless Provisions for Emergency and NonEmergency Care, Provider-Determined Out-of-Network Reimbursement
Rates

For emergency care, Massachusetts’s state preferred provider plan law
requires that insurers pay out-of-network providers “at the same [benefit] level
and in the same manner” as if a preferred provider treated the patient if the
patient could not “reasonably reach a preferred provider.” 74 For non-emergency
but medically necessary covered services rendered at an in-network facility,
Massachusetts state law requires that insurers cover the cost of such services,
even if partially performed by an out-of-network provider, with no greater cost
sharing to the patients where they did not have a “reasonable opportunity to
choose to have the service performed by [an in-network] provider.” 75 Nothing

72. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2006) (explaining that “[t]he business of insurance, and every person
engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business” and that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance”).
73. HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 6–7.
74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176I, § 3(b) (2016).
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176O, § 6(a)(4)(ii) (2016).
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in this legislative approach prohibits balance billing. Thus, in practice, patients
still receive balance bills but can usually resolve them by contesting the bill with
the insurer, usually through an internal appeals process. 76
In theory, this approach shifts the burden to the insurer to indemnify the
consumer and pay the out-of-network bill. However, in reality, consumers likely
do not know this is an available option and end up paying the balance bills on
their own. For the above consumer protection to work as intended, a method of
notifying consumers of their option to affirmatively contest the bill with their
insurer would be required. Even if consumers were notified of this option, the
process of protesting a balance bill through an internal appeals process is
confusing and burdensome, especially for someone who does not know the
technicalities of insurance or medical billing. 77 This approach also does not
incentivize communication or cooperation between the insurer, provider, and innetwork facility regarding transparency of network participation. Several
hospital officials reportedly said that “they have in-network contracts and
anything beyond that is a matter for insurance companies to handle with
individual doctors who are not under their control.” 78 Thus, health care facilities
in Massachusetts have taken a hands-off approach instead of recognizing the
role they could play in provider network formation.
B.

Texas: Hold Harmless Provisions for Emergency Care, ConsumerInitiated Mediation Process, State-Determined Methodology for Out-ofNetwork Reimbursement Rates

Consumer protections in Texas vary depending on the type of health plan
held by a consumer. HMOs and EPOs are regulated by hold harmless provisions.
HMOs are required to “pay for emergency care performed by [out-of-network]
physicians or providers at the usual and customary rate or at an agreed rate” if
the care was necessary. 79 Similarly, EPOs are required to “fully reimburse a
nonpreferred provider for . . . emergency care services at the usual and
customary rate or at a rate agreed to” between the plan and provider if a
consumer “cannot reasonably reach a preferred provider.” 80 This protection

76. Jack Sullivan, Out-of-Network Billing Surprises: Patients Get Charged for Unexpected
Services Not Covered by Their Insurance, COMMONWEALTH (Spring 2016), https://common
wealthmagazine.org/health-care/out-of-network-billing-surprises/ (quoting Matthew Day, senior
vice president at Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, “Our policy is to indemnify the member
from that balance bill”) (last visited July 28, 2017).
77. CONSUMER REPORTS NAT’L RESEARCH CTR., supra note 4, at 9 (reporting that thirty-five
percent of consumers who received surprise medical bills took no action to resolve their billing
issue, citing reasons such as “I was confused about what to do or found it too complicated” or “I
didn’t know how to take action/where to complain”).
78. Sullivan, supra note 76.
79. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1271.155(a) (West 2017).
80. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3725(a) (2017).
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seems to include surprise medical billing scenarios where a patient may not be
able to reasonably reach an in-network provider due to their emergency
condition. Like Massachusetts’s approach, here and in other states that instead
use a state-defined fee schedule to determine provider payment rates, there is no
ban on balance billing. Therefore, the out-of-network provider can simply send
bills to consumers for the balance of the out-of-network rate and the “usual and
customary rate.” Consumers can then contest these bills through their insurers’
internal appeals processes.
On the other hand, PPOs are regulated by transparency requirements and an
independent mediation process. PPOs are required to provide a current and
accurate directory of preferred providers online. 81 If the directory is found to be
inaccurate and consumers rely on it, consumers may have the out-of-pocket
expenses associated with the care counted toward both the in-network deductible
and out-of-pocket maximum. 82 Additionally, consumers may initiate a
mediation proceeding at no cost if they receive a balance bill for more than $500
by an “out-of-network hospital-based radiologist, anesthesiologist, pathologist,
emergency department physician, neonatologist, or assistant surgeon” by
submitting a “mediation request form.” 83 Then, the consumer (optional), health
plan, and out-of-network provider participate in an informal settlement
teleconference to attempt to agree on a reasonable rate for the service(s)
rendered. 84 If this does not result in an agreement, the consumer (optional),
health plan, and out-of-network provider participate in a formal mediation to
again attempt to agree on a reasonable rate. 85 The parties are not required to
reach an agreement at mediation, which means that the dispute may be referred
to a special judge for final resolution. 86 PPOs must provide notice of the above
rights to their beneficiaries. 87
The Texas regulation of HMOs and EPOs is concerning for reasons similar
to the Massachusetts legislation. Consumers may be completely unaware that
they have the option to contest a balance bill and end up paying the bill. An
internal appeals process can be very confusing for and burdensome on the
consumer. 88 The regulation of PPOs at least has an additional transparency
element that informs consumers that they have the option to contest a surprise
medical bill by requesting a mediation. However, the mediation process places
the burden on consumers, who must initiate the process if they wish to contest a
81. Id. § 3.3705(f)(1) (2017).
82. Id.
83. Id. §§ 3.3705(f)(1), 21.5010 (2017).
84. Id. § 21.5012.
85. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.054 (West 2017).
86. TEX. DEP’T. OF INS., Mediation for Out-of-Network Hospital-Based Health Care Provider
Claims, www.tdi.texas.gov/consumer/cpmmediation.html (last visited July 28, 2017).
87. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3705(f).
88. See CONSUMER REPORTS NAT’L RESEARCH CTR., supra note 4, at 9.
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balance bill. The mediation process, which includes an informal teleconference
and a formal mediation, is time consuming and intimidating to patients who have
limited knowledge of insurance and medical billing. Consumers may choose not
to participate in the teleconference and formal mediation, but then there is a
concern that the insurer and provider have no incentive to find a fair
reimbursement rate considering they are only arguing about what the patient will
pay out of pocket for the out-of-network service rendered. Even after these
proceedings, there is no requirement that an agreed upon rate is determined,
yielding a significantly inefficient use of time and resources. Consumers can
then bring the dispute to court, which will consume even more resources. The
Texas mediation process at least provides a forum for the out-of-network rate to
be disputed, but the process is burdensome and does not necessarily yield a result
in the same way as an alternative dispute resolution process, like arbitration.
C. New York: Prohibition of Balance Billing, Assignment of Benefits Form,
Extensive Disclosure and Transparency Requirements, State-Run
Arbitration Process
New York led the way in taking the most comprehensive approach to protect
consumers from surprise medical billing by holding patients harmless for bills
received for both emergency and non-emergency out-of-network care provided
at an in-network facility. 89 For emergency care, New York state law bans the
balance billing of patients for costs beyond the in-network cost-sharing amounts
that apply under their insurance plan. 90 For non-emergency care, patients who
receive a surprise medical bill can submit an “assignment of benefits” form that
authorizes the provider to bill the insurer directly, and are, accordingly, held
harmless for any out-of-pocket costs beyond the in-network cost-sharing
amounts that apply under their plan. 91 This approach provides the greatest
89. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 400.5(h) (2017).
90. Id. § 400.5(h) (“A health care plan shall ensure that the insured shall incur no greater outof-pocket costs for the services than the insured would have incurred with a participating physician
or participating health care provider for emergency services . . . .”).
91. Id. § 400.6(b) (“If an insured assigns benefits for a surprise bill in writing to a nonparticipating physician or non-participating referred health care provider that knows the insured is
insured under a health care plan, the non-participating physician or non-participating referred health
care provider shall not bill or seek payment from the insured except for any applicable copayment,
coinsurance or deductible that would be owed if the insured utilized a participating physician.”);
id. § 400.5(h)(2) (“A health care plan shall ensure that the insured shall incur no greater out-ofpocket costs for the services than the insured would have incurred with a participating physician or
participating health care provider: . . . for a dispute involving a surprise bill when the insured has
assigned benefits to a non-participating physician or a non-participating referred health care
provider.”). The “Assignment of Benefits Form” is short and simple for consumers to complete.
See N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., New York State Out-of-Network Surprise Bill Assignment of
Benefits Form (May 26, 2015), www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/health/OON_assignment_benefits_
form.pdf.
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protection to consumers by completely removing them from surprise billing
disputes, leaving the provider and insurer to resolve the issue among themselves.
While New York addresses balance billing in both the emergency and nonemergency contexts, some states have taken a more limited approach by only
banning balance billing for emergency services. 92
In addition to the balance billing prohibition and hold harmless provision,
New York law also has extensive disclosure and transparency requirements for
(1) insurers, (2) providers, and (3) hospitals. First, under state law, all health
plans are required to provide a “clear description of the methodology” that the
insurer uses to calculate out-of-network reimbursement rates, examples of
estimated out-of-pocket costs for “frequently billed out-of-network health care
services,” and both written and online information that “reasonably permits” an
enrollee to estimate their expected out-of-pocket costs for out-of-network care
in a given location, determined by the difference between the insurer’s
reimbursement rate and the usual and customary cost for out-of-network care. 93
Additionally, upon request, every health plan must “disclose the approximate
dollar amount that the insurer will pay for a specific out-of-network health care
service.” 94
Second, New York law requires out-of-network providers to give patients
notice before scheduled non-emergency services that, upon request, they can
obtain an estimate of anticipated costs for out-of-network services or a fee
schedule. 95 Third, state law mandates that hospitals post information on their
websites, including a list of plan networks in which the hospital participates; an
explanation that physician services are not included in hospital charges, and
therefore physicians may not participate in the same networks; a list of plan
networks in which the hospital’s employed physicians participate and their
contact information; and the contact information of physician groups with which
the hospital has contracted for anesthesiology, pathology, and radiology services
so that consumers can determine their network status. 96 This comprehensive
approach makes disclosure to the consumer the priority. Although it is
demanding on health care entities, it at least makes transparency the standard for
insurers, providers, and health care facilities alike, instead of placing the
majority of the disclosure burden on one party or another. Other states like
Connecticut have similar legislation but unlike the New York law, those states
only require disclosure and transparency from insurers and providers, not health
care facilities. 97
92. See, e.g., 18-1400-1403 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 1403-11.3.3 (2007) (“Emergency and
Urgent Care Services”).
93. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3217-a(a)(19)–(20) (McKinney 2015).
94. Id. § 3217-a(b)(14).
95. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 24(2) (McKinney 2015).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-591b (2012).
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Banning out-of-network providers from balance billing the patient directly
raises the previously-discussed concern that such providers may be unfairly
reimbursed by health insurers for care provided. However, New York law
addresses this concern by establishing a state-run arbitration process, the
Independent Dispute Resolution Entity (IDRE), to which a provider can appeal
to dispute the reasonableness of reimbursement. 98 The provider and insurer each
submit a proposed fee or payment to the IDRE, which makes a binding decision
by selecting the more reasonable fee. 99 If the dispute does not involve a health
plan, the IDRE determines a reasonable fee on its own. 100 In deciding the most
reasonable price for services rendered in both circumstances, the independent
arbitrators consider factors such as provider education and experience, case
circumstances and complexity, individual characteristics of the patient, and
usual and customary charges. 101 Theoretically, this type of “baseball arbitration”
works by incentivizing both provider and insurer to submit reasonable proposals
in order to avoid “being stuck with” the opposing party’s proposal. 102 Physician
groups such as the American College of Emergency Physicians support New
York’s statutory approach of extracting consumers from the billing dispute
resolution process. 103 Although state insurance law is expressly preempted by
ERISA for self-funded employer plans, 104 beneficiaries of such plans and
uninsured consumers can also appeal to the IDRE in an effort to reduce the
medical bill balance. 105 This is important considering the U.S. Department of

98. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 400.7(a)(2) (2015) (“Surprise bills: A health care
plan, a non-participating physician, a non-participating referred health care provider, an insured
who does not assign benefits, or a patient who is not an insured may submit a dispute regarding a
surprise bill to the superintendent for review by an IDRE.”).
99. Id. § 400.8(h) (“For disputes involving a health care plan, in determining a reasonable fee
for the services rendered, an IDRE shall select either the health care plan’s payment or the nonparticipating physician’s or, as applicable, the non-participating referred health care provider’s
fee.”).
100. Id. (“For disputes that do not involve a health care plan, the IDRE shall determine a
reasonable fee.”).
101. N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 604 (2016) (“Criteria for determining a reasonable fee”).
102. Mark Scherzer, New York’s New “Surprise Bill” Law Rolls Out New Health Insurance
Protections for Consumers, FAMILIES USA BLOG (Apr. 10, 2014), familiesusa.org/blog/2014/04/
new-york%E2%80%99s-new-surprise-bill-law-rolls-out-new-health-insurance-protections-con
sumers (last visited July 28, 2017).
103. Michelle Andrews, N.Y. Law Offers Model for Helping Consumers Avoid Surprise Outof-Network Charges, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 14, 2015), khn.org/news/n-y-law-offers-modelfor-helping-consumers-avoid-surprise-out-of-network-charges/ (last visited July 28, 2017).
104. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2012).
105. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 400.7(a)(2) (2015).
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Labor, which regulates self-funded plans, has not enacted any consumer
protections against surprise medical billing. 106
Compared to a mandated mediation process administered by a health plan
as recommended by the NAIC Model Act, the statutorily established
independent arbitration process is more efficient because an impartial arbitrator
can likely decide the reimbursement rate more quickly and fairly without
spending weeks in stubborn negotiations. The arbitration process ends with a
decision that binds both parties, as opposed to mediation that may never result
in a mutually agreed upon reimbursement rate. 107 Additionally, an independent
arbitrator reduces, or even eliminates, the bargaining power that one party may
have over the other because the arbitrator has complete discretion to decide a
reimbursement rate in dispute. Therefore, in surprise medical billing scenarios,
arbitration is a more effective billing dispute resolution process than mediation.
Other states have followed in New York’s footsteps by enacting similar
legislation to protect consumers from surprise medical billing, including
Florida, 108 California, 109 and Colorado. 110
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK THAT MAXIMIZES
CONSUMER PROTECTION
Consumers should not be caught in the middle of a medical billing dispute
when they are unaware of or unable to prevent receiving care from out-ofnetwork providers. The majority of consumers do not understand their legal
rights or the technicalities of medical billing and insurance regulation, making
them ill-equipped to navigate their options upon receiving surprise medical
bills. 111 The primary goal of state legislation regarding surprise medical billing
should be to protect vulnerable consumers by removing them from medical bill
disputes altogether. Instead, these disputes should be resolved by providers and

106. CONSUMERS UNION, GETTING STARTED ON SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS: AN ADVOCATE’S
GUIDE 4 (2015), consumersunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/SurprisebillsAdvocates
Guide.pdf.
107. Id. at 10.
108. See FLA. STAT. § 641.3154 (2016) (“Organization liability; provider billing prohibited”).
109. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9 (2016) (legislation banning out-of-network
providers from billing patients “more than the in-network cost-sharing amount for services” and
counting this cost sharing toward annual out-of-pocket limits); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1371.30 (2016) (legislation setting up an independent dispute resolution process).
110. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-704 (3)(a)(II) (2016) (legislation holding “consumer[s]
harmless for additional charges from out-of-network providers for care rendered in [an in-network]
facility”).
111. CONSUMER REPORTS NAT’L RESEARCH CTR., supra note 4, at 12 (reporting that sixtyseven percent of privately insured Americans did not know the state entity responsible for resolving
health insurance billing issues, and eighty-seven percent did not know which state governmental
agency handles complaints about health insurance).
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insurance companies who are better equipped to reach an agreement due to their
specialized knowledge of medical billing.
Accordingly, the best legislative approach to protect consumers and ensure
fair negotiations between insurance plans and providers is a modified version of
New York’s comprehensive approach. State legislatures who value consumer
protection should adopt a statutory framework that includes the following five
provisions: (1) for emergency services, ban out-of-network providers from
balance billing patients for costs beyond in-network cost sharing if services are
rendered at an in-network facility; (2) for non-emergency services, hold patients
harmless for out-of-pocket costs beyond in-network cost sharing if services are
rendered at an in-network facility if patients submit an assignment of benefits
form; (3) ban anti-assignment clauses from health plans in surprise medical
billing contexts to ensure that patients can assign benefits to providers; (4) count
cost sharing for services provided by an out-of-network provider towards annual
out-of-pocket limits; and (5) establish an independent, state-run dispute
resolution process that uses an external standard and is accessible by health
plans, out-of-network physicians, and both insured and uninsured patients.
These provisions best insulate consumers from unfair financial responsibility
arising from surprise medical billing situations, as explored further below. To
work in conjunction with the above five provisions, state legislatures should
additionally adopt disclosure and transparency requirements to prevent surprise
medical billing situations as often as possible and to protect informed consumer
choice.
A.

Outline and Justification of the Recommended Legislation

The five recommended provisions of this proposed comprehensive statute
realistically acknowledge the context of surprise medical billing and set up an
effective infrastructure to protect consumers and leave complex billing disputes
to those best positioned to determine a fair price: insurers and providers. By
primarily protecting the consumer above all other parties, this approach
encourages communication and negotiation between insurers, health facilities,
and providers.
1. Provision One
Provision One bans out-of-network providers from balance billing patients
for costs beyond in-network cost sharing for emergency services rendered at an
in-network facility. This provision completely removes the patient from the
medical billing dispute process from the very beginning. In emergency
situations, this is especially important because patients almost never have
control over the network status of their treating physicians or ambulance
providers. Therefore, because of this lack of control, it is not fair to hold patients
financially responsible for such services. Banning balance billing for emergency
services eliminates the possibility of consumers simply paying surprise medical
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bills received in the mail because they are unaware of any alternative option.
Thus, the approach of this provision requires very little, if any, consumer
education to be effective.
It is better to leave medical bill disputes to those who actually have a say in
the network arrangement, namely providers and health plans. Through banning
the balance billing of patients for emergency situations, the burden is placed on
the out-of-network provider and health plan to negotiate a fair price for services
rendered. If the health plan does not agree with the reasonableness of an out-ofnetwork provider’s asking price, or if an out-of-network provider does not agree
with the reasonableness of a health plan’s rate, either party can appeal to the
independent dispute resolution process set out in Provision Five. The option for
arbitration keeps the bargaining power between providers and health plans as
equal as possible. Banning balance billing is the most consumer-protective
strategy and is appropriate and necessary in emergency situations where
consumers are most vulnerable.
2. Provision Two
Similarly, Provision Two holds patients harmless for out-of-pocket costs
beyond in-network cost sharing for out-of-network non-emergency services
rendered at an in-network facility, as long as the patient submits an assignment
of benefits form. Like the New York law previously discussed, it is
recommended that states mandate an assignment of benefits form to accompany
any balance bill sent by an out-of-network provider to a consumer, thereby
immediately informing the consumer of the option to either pay the bill or fill
out the simple form to allow the provider to pursue payment. The form places
the burden on the out-of-network provider and health plan to negotiate a fair
price for services rendered and keeps the consumer removed from such
negotiations. Assigning benefits to out-of-network providers makes it easier for
such providers to collect payments because they are entitled to the benefits by
law. Creating a legal entitlement to benefits for providers is a useful strategy to
gain support from physician groups that may be otherwise disapproving of
legislation that limits the ability of out-of-network physicians to balance bill
patients. This provision essentially bans balance billing patients when an
assignment of benefits is in place, protecting the consumer in a similar manner
as Provision One, with an added attraction for out-of-network physicians
through the legal entitlement to plan benefits.
3. Provision Three
Provision Three bans anti-assignment clauses from health plans in surprise
medical billing contexts to ensure that patients can assign benefits to providers,
who can accordingly negotiate a reimbursement rate with the health plan
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directly. 112 This provision prevents health plans from strategically getting
around the hold harmless protection of Provision Two by simply adding an antiassignment clause to their contracts with consumers. Having a ban on antiassignment clauses is vital because consumers may not understand the
implications of all the terms in insurance contracts. Additionally, consumers
virtually never have the option to negotiate an anti-assignment clause because
insurance contracts are typically contracts of adhesion where each consumer has
limited bargaining power compared to the insurance company. 113 Accordingly,
the legislative framework needs to include a ban on anti-assignment clauses in
health insurance contracts to protect the consumer-protecting intention behind
Provision Two.
4. Provision Four
In the event that a consumer chooses to pay for non-emergency services
rendered by an out-of-network provider instead of assigning benefits to that
provider, Provision Four counts the payment towards annual out-of-pocket
limits. This provision is aimed at preventing consumers from being
overburdened by medical bills with high out-of-network service charges should
they choose to pay the bills. This provision would not apply to all balance billing
but only to surprise medical billing circumstances—where a patient is
unexpectedly billed for out-of-network services rendered at an in-network
facility—so as to prevent very sick patients from strategically reaching their outof-pocket limits quickly in order to have their health plans cover all remaining
costs.
5. Provision Five
Provision Five establishes an independent, state-run arbitration process
where health plans, out-of-network physicians, and patients can dispute
reimbursement rates for out-of-network services rendered. This dispute
resolution process is a better alternative to the NAIC Model Act’s and Texas’s
mediation processes because it concludes with a final, binding decision made by
an impartial arbitrator. Although arbitration tends to be more formal and
expensive than mediation, 114 arbitration is a better option in surprise medical

112. Modeled after Colorado law that requires insurers to permit the assigning of benefits to
out-of-network providers. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-106.7 (2016) (providing that “[a]ny carrier
that provides health coverage to a covered person shall allow, but not require, such covered person
under the policy to assign, in writing, payments due under the policy to a licensed hospital, other
licensed health care provider, an occupational therapist . . . , or a massage therapist”).
113. See Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today to
Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1766 (1992).
114. See Jeanne M. Brett et al., The Effectiveness of Mediation: An Independent Analysis of
Cases Handled by Four Major Service Providers, 12 NEGOTIATION J. 259, 259 (1996) (reviewing
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billing scenarios because the end result is always a binding reimbursement rate,
as opposed to an optional agreement subject to administrative appeal and then
judicial appeal.
To address concerns regarding New York’s baseball arbitration process, the
recommended process would instead use an external standard, such as a
percentage above Medicare rates (e.g., 150% the Medicare rate for a given
service), as the baseline rate. The health plan and out-of-network provider could
present evidence to the arbitrator explaining why the rate should be adjusted up
or down due to various factors, like those considered by New York arbitrators,
such as provider education and experience, case circumstances and complexity,
individual characteristics of the patient, and usual and customary charges. This
external standard would help to provide an environment to establish a truly fair
payment that will likely be set somewhere between the health plan’s offer price
and the out-of-network provider’s asking price. Thus, compromise in rate
negotiation would be consistently established instead of one side necessarily
“winning” and the other “losing” as in New York’s baseball arbitration process.
Health plans and providers alike will probably favor this method, especially after
giving input as to what the external baseline rate should be, because it simplifies
the negotiation process and ends in compromise instead of a one-sided outcome.
6. Recommended Disclosure and Transparency Requirements
In addition to the above framework, states should adopt legislation that
increases disclosure and transparency to prevent surprise medical bill
circumstances from arising in the first place when at all possible. As discussed
previously, New York’s disclosure and transparency framework is ideal because
it sets standards for all those involved in health care delivery: insurers, providers,
and health care facilities. Like the New York framework, health plans should be
required to keep a current and accurate provider directory available online with
a user-friendly interface, to provide a clear explanation of how out-of-network
reimbursement rates are calculated, examples of anticipated out-of-pocket costs
for out-of-network services that are often billed, and a written and online method
where consumers can estimate their expected out-of-pocket costs for out-ofnetwork care in a given location.
Furthermore, every health plan should be mandated to disclose the specific
cost of an out-of-network service that the insurer will pay upon request. Out-ofnetwork providers should also be required to give patients notice before a
scheduled non-emergency service that, upon request, they can obtain an estimate
of anticipated costs for out-of-network services or a fee schedule. Further,
hospitals should be required to post the following information on their websites:
(1) a list of plan networks in which the hospital participates, (2) an explanation
449 mediation cases and finding that mediation costs “far less than arbitration, took less time, and
was judged a more satisfactory process than arbitration”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

AVOIDING STICKER SHOCK

205

that physician services are not included in hospital charges and therefore
physicians may not participate in the same networks, (3) a list of plan networks
in which the hospital’s employed physicians participate and their contact
information, and (4) contact information of physician groups that the hospital
has contracted with for emergency medicine, anesthesiology, pathology,
radiology services, and other independent contractors so that consumers can
determine their network status. This comprehensive approach to disclosure
makes the consumer the priority and holds insurers, providers, and hospitals
alike to a high standard of transparency.
The higher standard of transparency might encourage health care facilities
to adopt internal corporate policies that require all providers, as a condition of
practicing there, to participate in the same health plan networks in which the
facility participates. Several facilities, such as Boca Raton Regional Hospital in
South Florida and Jewish Hospital in Louisville, Kentucky, have taken this
approach with a policy that requires its contracting anesthesiologists, emergency
physicians, pathologists, and radiologists to contract with the health plans in
which the hospital participates. 115 As a result of such a policy, the facilities have
processed fewer complaints regarding surprise medical billing, which is to be
expected because nearly all providers at the in-network facility now also have
in-network status. 116 This incentive is perhaps the most straightforward strategy
to eliminate scenarios in which surprise medical billing might occur, but it is
challenging to get providers and health plans to reach an agreement about rates
for services rendered. The AMA vehemently opposes the concept of facilities
forcing out-of-network providers to enter negotiations with health plans,
viewing this policy as “a methodology to coerce physicians through yet another
way to not receive sufficient payment.” 117 However, if such a policy becomes
commonplace among health care facilities, negotiated rates between out-ofnetwork providers and health plans may be more likely to reach a fair and
reasonable price. Having the industry voluntarily come to this consensus in
response to the transparency standards would likely receive more support than
mandating the above policy, such as by making it a Medicare condition of
participation, although this is another potential option.
It remains important to recognize that disclosure and transparency cannot
always prevent surprise medical bill situations. Many consumers who fall victim
to surprise medical billing were in an emergency condition or anesthetized at the
time of service when an out-of-network provider unexpectedly participated in
their care. Therefore, while these disclosure and transparency measures are
essential to protect informed consumer choice, they cannot wholly eliminate
surprise medical billing. Thus, the proposed framework is necessary to work in
115. Herman, supra note 17.
116. See id.
117. Meyer, supra note 21.
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conjunction with disclosure and transparency measures to best protect
consumers.
B.

Implementation and Enforcement of the Recommended Legislation

To ensure successful enactment and implementation, states must first
consider the political feasibility of the above comprehensive surprise medical
bill legislation. In general, supporters of a comprehensive approach include
consumer groups 118 and state health plan associations. 119 State medical
associations have been inconsistent in terms of their support for such an
approach. 120 Ancillary providers who are often out-of-network providers in
billing situations, such as anesthesiologists and radiologists, tend to disapprove
of the comprehensive approach. 121 States must be prepared to navigate their
particular stakeholders and to strategically emphasize the ultimate goal of this
legislation: to protect consumers by removing them entirely from medical bill
disputes, leaving only those best equipped to negotiate about rates (providers
and health plans) at the table.
After the legislation is enacted, it is essential to inform consumers about
their new options when they receive a surprise medical bill. Thus, as in New
York’s legislation, both health plans and providers will be required to disclose
to consumers that they are not financially responsible for any amount above that

118. See Harris Meyer, Florida Governor Signs Law Shielding Patients from Surprise Medical
Bills, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 14, 2016), www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160414/NEWS
/160419946 (last visited July 28, 2017); FLA. HOUSE OF REPS. STAFF ANALYSIS, CS/CS/HB 221
OUT-OF-NETWORK HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, at 4 (2016), www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill
/2016/221/Analyses/h0221c.APC.PDF (outlining the Florida Insurance Consumer Advocate’s
recommendations for legislation that would “[h]old consumers harmless (prohibit ‘balance billing’)
in emergency and ‘surprise billing’ situations[,] [e]stablish an alternative dispute resolution process
to allow nonparticipating providers to challenge the amount of payment received from an insurer[,]
. . . [r]equire insurers to update their provider directories on a timely basis[, and] [r]equire hospitals
to make data available regarding hospital-based providers who are not in the network”).
119. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 118 (reporting that the CEO of the Florida Association of
Health Plans declared, “This is the most comprehensive consumer protection legislation in the
country on (this issue), and our association is proud to support it . . . . The stakeholders came
together and agreed to remove patients from the middle of disputes between insurers and
providers.”).
120. Id. (reporting that while the Florida Medical Association supported Florida’s
comprehensive consumer protection legislation, the California Medical Association strongly
opposed its similar law, “arguing that it would hinder consumers’ ability to use their plans’ out-ofnetwork benefits and give plans too much negotiating leverage over physicians”).
121. Id. (reporting that anesthesiology and radiology groups strongly opposed Florida’s
comprehensive law); see also Harris Meyer, Passage of California Surprise-Bill Legislation Could
Spur Other States to Act, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Sept. 1, 2016), www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20160901/NEWS/160909980 (last visited July 28, 2017) (reporting that physician groups
representing plastic surgeons, cardiologists, and anesthesiologists were strongly against
California’s comprehensive law).
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which they would normally pay if they had received care from an in-network
provider, along with information about the assignment of benefits form, the
independent dispute resolution process, and where to file a complaint through
the state. The simplest way to start enforcing the legislation is through
monitoring consumer and provider complaint data collected through the state.
Enforcement of the recommended legislation would involve a collaboration of
agencies, such as the state insurance department that has jurisdiction over health
plans and the state medical board that has jurisdiction over licensed providers.
These agencies would jointly investigate illegal balance billing by either health
plans or medical providers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Now is the time for state legislatures to act. As narrow provider networks
continue to thrive as a premium-lowering mechanism, it is more important than
ever to protect vulnerable consumers from surprise medical billing by enacting
comprehensive legislation as recommended above. Consumers should not be
stuck with outrageous balance bills in circumstances where they have no control
over which providers participate in their care, despite playing by the rules and
attempting to utilize only the services of in-network providers. Therefore, states
should adopt the recommended statutory framework, based on a modified
version of New York’s comprehensive law, because it both insulates consumers
from unfair financial responsibility and promotes informed consumer choice,
which can prevent surprise medical bills from arising, through transparency and
disclosure. It is time to aggressively address surprise medical bill sticker shock
once and for all.
MERLOW M. DUNHAM *

* Bachelor of Arts in Biochemistry, Saint Louis University; Master of Health Administration, Saint
Louis University College for Public Health & Social Justice (anticipated 2019); Juris Doctor, Saint
Louis University School of Law (anticipated 2019). The author would like to thank Professor Tim
Greaney for his thoughtful insight and guidance; Jeffrey, the rest of her family, and friends for their
continuous support; and the Editorial Board of Volume 11 of the Saint Louis University Journal of
Health Law & Policy for their dedication and hard work.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

208

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 11:179

